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a b s t r a c t
We consider a general class of non-cooperative games related to combinatorial covering
and facility location problems. A game is based on an integer programming formulation
of the corresponding optimization problem, and each of the k players wants to satisfy a
subset of the constraints. For that purpose, resources available in integer units must be
bought, and their cost can be shared arbitrarily between players.We consider the existence
and cost of exact and approximate pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In general, the prices of
anarchy and stability are in Θ(k) and deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
is NP-hard. Under certain conditions, however, cheap Nash equilibria exist, in particular if
the integrality gap of the underlying integer program is 1, or in the case of single constraint
players. We also present algorithms that compute simultaneously near-stable and near-
optimal approximate Nash equilibria in polynomial time.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade the area of algorithmic game theory has evolved, inwhich computational environments are analyzed
using game-theoretic models. Motivated to a large part by the Internet, the resulting effects and dynamics of introducing
selfish behavior of independent agents into a computational environment are studied. In this paper we follow this line of
research by considering a general class of non-cooperative games based on general covering integer problems. Problems
concerning service installation or clustering, which play an important role in large networks like the Internet, formally are
modeled as some variant of covering, partition, or facility location problems. The Internet is composed, built, andmaintained
by a multitude of different parties – companies, governmental institutions, as well as private users – which all have their
personal interests and goals. In particular, investments into the infrastructure of the network like establishing connections or
placement and installation of service technology are done by telecommunication companies that strive to sell products and
tomaximize profits. This requiresmodeling these scenarios using economical, and in particular, game-theoretic approaches.
Our games can serve as a basis to analyze service installation and investment problems in the presence of independent non-
cooperative selfish agents.
The formulation of our games generalizes an approach by Anshelevich et al. [6], who proposed games in the setting of
Steiner forest design. In particular, we consider a covering optimization problem given as an integer linear program and
turn this into a non-cooperative game as follows. Each of the k non-cooperative players considers a subset of the constraints
and strives to satisfy them. Players offer money for the purchase of units of resources, which are modeled by the variables.
A variable is raised in bought integer units if the resulting cost in the objective function is paid for by the players. Bought
units can be used by all players simultaneously to satisfy their constraints — no matter whether they contribute to the cost
or not. A player strives to minimize her cost, but insists on satisfaction of her constraints. A variety of covering problems,
most prominently variants of set cover and facility location, can be turned into a game with the help of this approach.
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In these games, the problem of finding the social optimum solution is represented by the underlying integer program. The
problem of finding the best response strategy for a player i represents an adjusted subproblem. It is derived by dropping
all the constraints of players other than i and reducing the cost coefficients in the objective function by the share that is
contributed by other players.
We investigate our non-cooperative games in terms of stable solutions, which are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
game. We do not consider mixed strategy equilibria, because our environment requires a concrete investment rather than
a randomized action, which would be the result of a mixed strategy. Hence, when using the term ‘‘Nash equilibrium’’ we
mean pure strategy exact Nash equilibria unless mentioned otherwise. First, we study the price of anarchy [35,42], which is
the ratio of the cost of theworst Nash equilibrium over the cost of aminimum cost cover satisfying all constraints of all play-
ers for a game. In addition, we consider the price of stability [5], which measures the best Nash equilibrium in terms of the
optimum cost instead of the worst equilibrium. Both of these measures, however, can be prohibitively high, and pure Nash
equilibria might not exist in our games. Hence, we focus on a trade-off between stability and optimality by considering a
two-parameter optimization problem to find (α, β)-approximate Nash equilibria (denoted as (α, β)-NE). These are states in
which each player can reduce her cost by unilateral deviation by at most a factor of α and that represent a β-approximation
to the socially optimum cost. We refer to α as the stability ratio and β as the approximation ratio. Intuitively, we strive to
obtain a state with small values for α and β . This guarantees that it is near-stable and near-optimal.
Note that, in contrast to the additive concept of ε-Nash equilibrium [23] used in the game theory literature, our
parameters are multiplicative ratios. The reason that we chose to use multiplicative ratios is that in our games each player
is required to optimize a combinatorial optimization problem to find a best response strategy. Most of these problems
turn out to be NP-complete. In this case a multiplicative stability ratio has the advantage that results directly relate to
approximation algorithmswithmultiplicative approximation factors,whichmight be used byplayers to find good strategies.
Such algorithms have been proposed for many of the underlying optimization problems we consider in this paper.
1.1. Outline and contributions
We study our games with respect to the quality of pure strategy exact and approximate Nash equilibria. Throughout the
paper we denote a feasible solution by C indicating that it forms a cover, and denote the social optimum solution byC∗. Our
contributions are as follows.
Section 2 introduces covering games using the special case of vertex cover and provides some initial observations. In
Section 3 we show the lower bounds for the vertex cover game. The price of anarchy is k even if the underlying graph is a
tree. There exist simple unweighted and weighted games for two players without exact Nash equilibria. They can be used
to prove that the price of stability can be arbitrarily close to k− 1. Determining the existence of exact Nash equilibria for a
given game is NP-hard, even for unweighted games or two players.
In Section 4 we specify classes of set cover games for which exact Nash equilibria exist and the price of stability is 1. For
games, in which the underlying integer program has an integrality gap 1, our proof is based on linear programming duality.
This yields a polynomial time algorithm to calculate cheap exact Nash equilibria. For the class of singleton games, in which
each player owns exactly one element, the proof is based on a local improvement method. This can be turned into an FPTAS
that yields (1 + ε,O(log n))-NE in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0. Thus, every player can improve her payments
through a selfish defection by a factor of at most 1+ ε, and the bought cover is an O(log n)-approximation of the minimum
cost cover for all players.
In Section 5 we further consider the problem of finding (α, β)-NE, i. e., cost sharings of covers that are cheap and allow
low incentives for players to deviate.We propose a simple algorithm for set cover games that finds (f, f)-NE, in which f is the
maximum frequency of any item in the sets. For vertex cover gameswith f = 2we show that any gamehas a (2, 1)-NE. This is
tight, because there are general vertex cover games without an (α, β)-NE for any α < 2. Recent progress on the complexity
status of the minimum vertex cover problem can be used to reasonably conjecture that there can be no polynomial time
algorithmwith a better guarantee for the approximation ratio β as well. For planar games our argument extends to a lower
bound of 1.5 on α. It can be increased close to 2 by forcing β to be close to 1, indicating a trade-off between the ratios.
In Section 6 we discuss facility location games. The results and proofs mainly translate previous arguments given for
covering games. Even in themost simple variant, themetric uncapacitated facility location (UFL) game, the price of anarchy is
exactly k, the price of stability as high as k−2, and it isNP-hard to determinewhether a game has an exact Nash equilibrium.
However, if every player has only a single client, it follows from [6] that the price of stability is 1 and that (1+ε, 1.5)-NE can
be found in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0. For the metric UFL game there is an algorithm to compute (3, 3)-NE in
polynomial time. We will extend the ideas to a more general setting coming from [26], which we term connection-restricted
facility location (CRFL). For a subclass of closed CRFL (CCRFL) games, the price of stability is 1 if the integrality gap of the
corresponding LP-relaxation is 1. The best Nash equilibrium can be derived with LP-duality.
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained in this paper. Column ‘‘Game Class’’ denotes the class of games; Covering for
the general case, set cover, UFL or CCRFL for more specific games; finally, the special cases integral, metric, and singleton as
mentioned above. Column ‘‘NE’’ shows whether or not an exact Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, and whether or not
it is hard to decide existence. Column ‘‘find best NE’’ shows the complexity of finding the best Nash equilibrium. Column
‘‘[PoA, PoS]’’ shows the upper bounds on the price of anarchy as well as the lower bounds on the price of stability. Finally,
‘‘apx. NE’’ displays the bounds on (α, β)-NE that can be computed in polynomial time.
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Table 1
Main results.
Game Class NE find best NE [PoA, PoS] apx. NE
Covering See Set Cover
Set Cover(SC) NP-hard [k, k− 1] (f, f)
Singleton SC
√
NP-hard [k, 1] (1+ ε,O(log n))
Integral SC
√
P [k, 1] (1, 1)
CRFL NP-hard [∞, k− 2]
Metric UFL NP-hard [k, k− 2] (3, 3)
Singleton UFL
√ [k, 1] (1+ ε, 1.5)
Integral CCRFL
√
P [∞, 1] (1, 1)
Part of this work has appeared previously in two extended abstracts [11,29]. In [11] we treated only the case of vertex
cover games, whereas the remaining results of this paper are reported in [29]. In [11] many proofs are sketched or missing
(e.g., NP-hardness to determine the existence of exact Nash equilibria, the existence of (2, 1)-NE, and the computation of
(2, 2)-NE in polynomial time), which are presented in full detail in this paper. In addition, instead of bipartiteness of the
graph as stated in [11], the right condition for the existence of Nash equilibria is an integrality gap of 1 for the LP. While this
condition is considered for the more general class of set cover games in [29], a full proof of the result has not been given
before this paper. In addition, we present complete proofs that were presented only as sketches in [29], for instance for the
price of stability and the existence and computability of (3, 3)-NE in metric UFL games, and for (f, f)-NE in set cover games.
1.2. Discussion and related work
Our analysis uses concepts developed for non-cooperative games in the area of algorithmic game theory, in particular
prices of anarchy and stability characterizing worst- and best-case Nash equilibria. The price of anarchy has been studied in
a large and diverse number of games, e.g., in areas like routing and congestion [35,43,7], network creation [6,24], wireless
ad-hoc networks [20,28], or facility location [45]. The price of stability [5] has been introduced more recently and studied
for instance in network creation games [5,31] or linear congestion games [16].
The non-cooperative model we consider stems from [6], who proposed a connection game based on the Steiner forest
problem. They show that prices of anarchy and stability areΘ(k) and give a polynomial time algorithm for (4.65+ε, 2)-NE.
In our uncapacitated facility location (UFL) game we assume that each of the clients must be connected directly to a facility.
The connection requirement for a client cannot be satisfied by connecting it to a different client, which is (possibly over
other clients) connected to a facility. Hence, it is possible to turn this into a single source connection game on a directed
graph. The idea is to introduce a source node s, connect all facilities f to it and direct all edges from clients to facilities. The
costs for the new edges (f , s) are given by the opening costs c(f ) of the corresponding facilities. If we allow connecting to
facilities using longer paths, the same construction allows us to turn the game into an undirected single source connection
game (SSC) considered in [6,30]. For both the UFL and the SSC game results in [6] suggest that the price of anarchy is k and
the price of stability is 1 if each player has a single client. In [30] we provided improved algorithms for (3.1 + ε, 1.55)-NE
for the SSC game. In addition, we showed that deciding the existence of exact Nash equilibria is NP-hard. Extended results
on the price of stability for Steiner network and group formation games have been obtained recently in [3,4].
A similar model for non-cooperative cost sharing in covering scenarios was proposed by Anshelevich et al. [5], who
study an egalitarian cost sharing protocol closely related to the Shapley value. The resulting game is a potential game [40],
i.e., pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, and the price of stability is in Θ(log k). Variants of this game recently
have been subject to increased research interest [14,13,22,12,1]. For a class of similar protocols for network cost sharing
games, Chen et al. [15] derived a characterization of the ones that allow pure Nash equilibria and showed that the Shapley
protocol results inminimal prices of anarchy and stability. Themainmotivation for the study of these aspects is the design of
routing protocols. The task is to set cost sharing rules in order to obtain favorable properties in the resulting game like pure
Nash equilibria and low equilibrium inefficiency. Player strategies are limited by design to choosing routes. However, when
considering the interplay of companies building the Internet, there is no agency that is able to prescribe a certain way of
sharing the cost of an investment. Instead,we take amore general approachwith payment functions as strategies, a standard
in the area of cost sharing mechanisms. On one hand, this results in non-existence of pure Nash equilibria and a high price
of stability. On the other hand, in many settings (including ours) finding an optimal investment strategy is NP-hard. This
makes it reasonable to consider cheap approximate equilibria, which exist in our model because of more general strategy
spaces.
Another model, which is close to our approach, are cooperative games and mechanism design problems based on
optimization. The set cover problem is a fundamental combinatorial optimization problem and has been studied for decades.
Recently, a cooperative set cover game was studied by Immorlica et al. [32]. In this coalitional game, each item is an agent
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and each coalition of players is associated with a certain cost value — the cost of a minimum cover. In [32] cross-monotonic
cost sharing schemes were investigated. For each coalition of players covered they distribute the cost to players in a way
that every player is better off if the coalition expands. The authors showed that for vertex cover no more than O(n−
1
3 ), for
set cover no more than O( 1n ) and for uncapacitated facility location no more than
1
3 of the cost can be charged to the agents
with a cross-monotonic scheme, respectively.
Closely related to cooperative games is the study of cost sharing mechanisms. In this scenario a central authority
distributes a service to players and strives for their cooperation. Starting with [19] cost sharing mechanisms for set cover
problems have been considered. Every player corresponds to a single item and has a private utility (i.e., a willingness to pay)
for being in the cover. The mechanism asks each player for her utility value. Based on this information its goal is to pick a
subset of items to be covered, to find a minimum cost cover for the subset and to distribute costs to covered item players
such that no coalition can be covered at a smaller cost. A strategyproof mechanism allows no player to lower her cost by
misreporting her utility value. The authors in [19] presented strategyproof mechanisms for set cover and facility location
games. For set cover games this work was extended recently by [37,36] to the consideration of different social desiderata
like fairness aspects and model formulations with items or sets being agents.
More general cooperative games based on covering/packing problems were studied in [17]. It was shown that the core
of such games is non-empty if and only if the integrality gap is 1. Additional results included polynomial time computability
of core members in a number of games encompassed by this framework. In [26] similar results are shown for a general class
of facility location games and an appropriate integer programming formulation.
Cooperative games and the mechanism design framework are used to capture situations with selfish service receivers
who can either cooperate to an offered cost sharing or manipulate. Players may also be excluded from the game depending
on their utility. A major goal has been to derive good cost sharing schemes that guarantee truthfulness or budget balance.
Our game, however, is strategic and non-cooperative in nature and allows players a much richer set of actions. In our game
each player is motivated to participate in the game. We investigate uncoordinated service installation scenarios rather than
a coordinated environment with a mechanism choosing customers, providing service, and charging costs.
Under the name competitive location there has been a high research activity on game-theoretic models for spatial and
graph-based facility location during the last decades [21,39]. These models consider players as facility owners that selfishly
decide where to open a facility. Clients are modeled as part of the utility functions of the players, e.g., they are assumed to
connect to the closest facility and thus represent part of the revenue a player gets from opening a facility. Recent examples of
this kind of location games are also found in [18,45]. According to our knowledge, however, none of these models considers
the clients as non-cooperative players that need to create connections and facilities without central coordination.
2. Covering games
2.1. Vertex and set cover games
We start by introducing covering games for the important special case of vertex cover. The vertex cover game for k players
is defined as follows. In an undirected graph G = (V , E)with n = |V | andm = |E| each player i owns a set Ei ⊆ E of edges.
We denote byG[Ei] the graph induced by the edges in Ei, and by V (G[Ei]) the set of vertices ofG[Ei].Without loss of generality
we assume that E = ⋃i Ei, as any edge not owned by a player is irrelevant in the game. Each player strives to establish a
service at one or both endpoints of each of her edges. For each vertex v there is a nonnegative cost c(v) for establishing a
service at this vertex. A strategy for a player i is a function pi : V → R+0 specifying an offer to costs of each vertex. A state
or payment scheme is a vector p = (p1, . . . , pk) specifying a strategy for each player. If the sum of offers of all players for
vertex v exceeds its cost (i.e., if
∑
i pi(v) ≥ c(v)) it is considered bought. Bought vertices can be used by all players to cover
their incident edges. The individual cost of a player is ci(p) = ∑v∈V pi(v) if there is a cover of bought vertices for Ei and
ci(p) = ∞ otherwise. Hence, a player tries to minimize her investment but insists on covering her edges.
A (pure strategy) exactNash equilibrium is a payment scheme such that no player i can unilaterally improve her individual
cost by changing her strategy, that is ci(pi, p−i) ≤ ci(p′i, p−i) for any player i and strategy p′i . Note that we consider only pure
strategy Nash equilibria in this paper. The social cost of a state p is given by the sum of player costs c(p) =∑i ci(p). A social
optimum is a strategy profile p∗ such that p∗ = argminp c(p). It is easy to verify that in a Nash equilibrium p a vertex v is
either bought exactly or not at all, i.e.,
∑
i pi(v) = c(v) or
∑
i pi(v) = 0. Furthermore, in every Nash equilibrium the set of
bought vertices contains one incident vertex for every edge e ∈ Ei of every player i, because otherwise the respective player
is not satisfied. Thus, the set of bought vertices in a Nash equilibrium is a vertex cover C ⊆ V such that for each e ∈ E there is
at least one incident vertex in C. For the social cost of a Nash equilibrium p this implies c(p) = c(C) =∑v∈C c(v)with the
corresponding cover C. A similar observation holds for the social optimum p∗; it is easy to observe that in p∗ the vertices of
a minimum cost vertex cover C∗ are bought exactly, and thus c(p∗) = c(C∗). In this way, Nash equilibria and social optima
represent cost sharings of possibly different vertex covers.
To quantify the inefficiency of the covers bought in Nash equilibria, we consider the price of anarchy and the price of
stability, i.e., the ratio of the cost of the worst and best Nash equilibrium over the cost of the social optimum, respectively.
The price of anarchy is defined as the maximum of c(p)/c(C∗) for any Nash equilibrium p. Similarly, the price of stability
is the minimum of c(p)/c(C∗) for any Nash equilibrium p. In addition, we consider approximate Nash equilibria. A (α, β)-
NE is a payment scheme p such that c(pi, p−i) ≤ αc(p′i, p−i) for any player i and strategy p′i , and that c(p) ≤ βc(C∗).
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In such a state every player can improve her cost at most by a factor of α by switching to another strategy, and the total
payments approximate the minimum cost cover by a factor β . We will refer to the factor β as the approximation ratio, and
we term α as the stability ratio. Finally, we call a vertex cover game unweighted if all vertices have equal costs, andweighted
otherwise. We refer to games with a planar graph G as planar games.
This construction is easily generalized to a set cover game, which is based on an instance of the set cover problem. In the
set cover problem there is a set S of n sets S over a set E ofm elements. For each S ∈ S we have S ⊆ E and a cost c(S) ≥ 0.
The problem is to find a subset of S covering all elements with minimum total cost. Note that in the special case of vertex
cover elements are edges, and vertices can be seen as sets of incident edges. Using this analogy, it is easy to generalize all
the constructions above to this case. In particular, in a set cover game, each player i strives to cover a set of elements Ei.
Player i chooses pi with pi(S) being the payments offered to set S. Set S is bought if the total contributions exceed the cost
c(S). A Nash equilibrium p represents a cost sharing of a set cover C ⊆ S of E, i.e., a set of sets such that⋃S∈C S = E. A
social optimum p∗ is a cost sharing of a set cover C∗ of minimum total cost. By f = maxe∈E |{S ∈ S | e ∈ S}| we denote the
maximum frequency of any element in the sets. Note that a vertex cover game is a set cover game with f = 2, as each edge
is incident to exactly two vertices.
2.2. Integer covering games
Our games have an interesting connection to the linear programming formulation of the underlying optimization
problem. Consider an instance of the vertex cover problem, in which we simply strive to find C∗, as an integer linear
program. For each vertex v there is a binary variable xv indicating whether it is in the cover or not. Furthermore, for each
edge e = (u, v) there is a constraint xu+xv ≥ 1 ensuring that e is covered. The cost of a vertex is given by the cost coefficient
c(v), which appears in the objective function.
Min
∑
v∈V
c(v)xv
subject to xv + xu ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E
xv ∈ {0, 1} ∀v ∈ V .
(1)
Suppose for a vertex cover game the underlying optimization problem of finding C∗ is described by the above integer
program. Then a player actually strives to satisfy the constraints corresponding to her edges. This is done by offering money
to the purchase of variable units (i.e., vertices). Once the sum of offers exceeds the cost given by the coefficient in the
objective function, it is considered bought and can be used by all players to satisfy their constraints (i.e., cover their edges).
The remaining specification of the game and the definitions follow accordingly.
This formulation of the game allows a straightforward translation to games based on arbitrary covering integer programs.
A covering game is based on a covering integer problem (CIP) [44, chapter 13.2] given as
Min
n∑
f=1
c(f )xf
subject to
n∑
f=1
atf xf ≥ bt ∀t = 1, . . . ,m
xf ∈ N ∀f = 1, . . . , n.
(2)
All constants are assumed to have non-negative (rational) entries atf , bt , c(f ) ≥ 0 for all t = 1, . . . ,m and f = 1, . . . , n.
Each player i owns a subset of the constraints Ci ⊂ {1, . . . ,m}, which she strives to satisfy. Integral units of a resource f
have a cost c(f ). They must be bought to be available for constraint satisfaction. Each player offers money to purchase some
integral units of the resources f . A unit is considered bought if the sum of all offered payments of all players purchase its
cost. If a unit is paid for, it can be used by all players no matter whether they contribute to the cost or not.
More formally, we assume that each player i chooses a strategy pi to specify the non-negative contribution pi(f ) to each
resource f . In a state p = (p1, . . . , pk) a total of xf = b∑i pi(f )/cf c units of resource f are bought, and the contribution
of player i to each unit is pi(f )/xf . The individual cost is ci(p) = ∑f pi(f ) if∑f atf xf ≥ bt for all t ∈ Ci and ci(p) = ∞
otherwise. Thus, as before, a player minimizes the investment but insists on satisfying her constraints. The notions of Nash
equilibrium, social optimum, and (α, β)-NE follow accordingly. Note that in a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum no
player contributes to an unbought unit, and the bought units are paid for exactly. Thus,we again have that aNash equilibrium
p and a social optimum p∗ correspond to feasible and optimal solutions x and x∗ of the CIP instance, respectively. The
payments represent a cost sharing of these solutions. This again implies that for a Nash equilibrium p and a social optimum
p∗ we have
∑
i pi(f ) = c(f )xf , and
∑
i p
∗
i (f ) = c(f )x∗f . Note that this general formulation includes vertex and set cover
games as special cases.
2.3. Initial observations
The following observations can be used to simplify a game. Suppose a constraint is not included in any of the players
constraint sets. This constraint has no influence on the game. Hence, in the following w.l.o.g. we will assume that the sets Ci
cover all constraints. In particular, for the vertex cover game this means E =⋃ki=1 Ei.
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a b
Fig. 1. Vertex cover games for two players without Nash equilibria. (a) weighted game; (b) unweighted game. Edge type indicates player ownership. For
the weighted game numbers at vertices indicate vertex costs.
For the vertex cover game we observe a decomposition property. For a player i assume the graph G[Ei] induced by
the players edge set Ei is not connected. The player has to cover the edges in each component and her optimum strategy
decomposes to cover both components independently at minimum cost. Hence, we can form another game in which the
edges for each of the ki components are owned by a different subplayer i1, . . . , iki . Suppose we adjust the game like this and
derive an (approximate) Nash equilibrium under the condition that the edges of each player form only a single connected
component. When we translate this payment scheme back to the original game, the stability ratio can only improve. This
property can be translated to covering games, however, it does not seem to have a similar intuitive meaning.
Finally, suppose a constraint t is owned by a player i and a set of players J . Now consider a Nash equilibrium for an
adjusted game in which the constraint is owned only by player i. In this equilibrium a player j ∈ J has no better strategy to
satisfy the constraints in Cj − t . However, t is satisfied as well, potentially by a different player. If t is added to Cj again, j
has no incentive to deviate from her strategy. This is due to the fact that the individual cost of a player can only increase by
adding constraints. The Nash equilibrium for the adjusted game yields a Nash equilibrium in the original game. Clearly, the
other direction is not true: Consider a game with a single resource f and a single constraint xf ≥ 1 owned by two players. A
Nash equilibrium is obtained, e.g., if the players share the cost of resource f in equal shares. This can be no Nash equilibrium
for the case, in which only one player owns the constraint. Nevertheless, for the computation of approximate equilibria we
will for convenience use an adjusted game and assume that all constraint sets Ci are mutually disjoint. The above idea can
be used to show that the derived bounds on the ratios continue to hold for the original game, in which the sets Ci overlap.
3. Quality and existence of Nash equilibria
In this section we consider lower bounds on the quality of Nash equilibria in vertex cover games and on the hardness of
determining their existence. In general it is not possible to guarantee their existence, they can be hard to find or expensive.
At first, observe that the price of anarchy in the vertex cover game is exactly k, and that this result generalizes to general
covering games.
Theorem 1. The price of anarchy in any covering game is at most k, and there exists a vertex cover game with price of anarchy
at least k.
Proof. Consider a star in which each vertex has cost 1 and each player owns a single edge. The minimum cost cover C∗ is
the center vertex of cost 1. If each player purchases the vertex of degree 1 incident to her edge, we get a Nash equilibrium of
cost k. Hence, the price of anarchy is at least k. On the other hand, k is a simple upper bound. If there is a Nash equilibrium C
with c(C) > kc(C∗), there is at least one player i that pays more than c(C∗). She could unilaterally improve by purchasing
C∗ all by herself. As the argumentation for the upper bound does not use specific properties of the vertex cover game, it
continues to hold for all covering games. 
Note that the price of anarchy is k even for very simple games, in which every player owns only one edge and G is a tree.
Hence, we will in the following consider existence and quality of the best Nash equilibrium in a game.
Lemma 1. There are planar vertex cover games for two players without Nash equilibria.
Proof. We consider the game for two players in Fig. 1(a) for an ε > 0. For this game we consider the four possible covers. A
cover including all three vertices cannot be an equilibrium, because vertex u is not needed by any player to fulfill the covering
requirement. Hence, any player contributing to the cost of u could feasibly improve by removing these payments. Suppose
the cover representing an equilibrium includes v1 and v2. If player 1 contributes to v1, she can remove these payments,
because she only needs v2 to cover her edge. With the symmetric statement for v2 we can see that in equilibrium player 1
could not pay anything. Player 2, however, cannot purchase both v1 and v2, because buying u offers a cheaper alternative
to cover her edges. Finally, suppose u and v1 are in the cover. In equilibrium player 1 will not pay anything for u. Player 2,
however, cannot purchaseu completely, becausev2 offers a cheaper alternative to cover the edge (u, v2).With the symmetric
observation for the cover of u and v2, we see that there is no feasible cover that can be purchased in a Nash equilibrium.With
similar arguments we can prove that the game on K4 depicted in Fig. 1(b) has no Nash equilibria. This proves the lemma. 
Note that every game with fewer edges, vertices, or players than the game in Fig. 1(a) is guaranteed to have a Nash
equilibrium.
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Fig. 2. A game with k = 8, for which the cost of any Nash equilibrium is close to (k− 1)c(C∗). Numbering of edges indicates player ownership. Indicated
vertices have cost ε′  1, vertices without labels have cost 1.
Fig. 3. Extended triangle used in the proof of Theorem 3. This game does not have any Nash equilibrium. To stabilize the extended triangle in the gadgets
described below, a third player can either buy u1 completely, then the first two players can pay for u2 and v1; or reduce the cost of v1 of 0.5, allowing the
first two players to pay 0.9 for v1 and 1.6 for v2 .
Theorem 2. For any ε > 0 there is a weighted vertex cover game in which the price of stability is at least (k − 1) − ε. There is
an unweighted vertex cover game in which the price of stability is k+24 .
Proof. Consider a game as depicted in Fig. 2. The social optimum cover includes the center vertex of the star and three
vertices of the K4-gadget yielding a total cost of 1 + 3ε′. If the center vertex of the star is in the cover and we assume to
have a Nash equilibrium, no player other than players 1 and 2 can contribute anything to vertices of the K4-gadget incident
to edges of player 1 and 2. For this network structure, however, it is easy to note that players 1 and 2 cannot agree on a set
of vertices covering their edges. Hence, to allow for a Nash equilibrium, the star center must not be picked which in turn
requires all other adjacent star vertices to be in the cover. Under these conditions the best feasible cover includes the vertex
that connects K4 to the star yielding a cost of k− 1+ 3ε′. Note that we can derive a Nash equilibrium purchasing this cover
by assigning each player to purchase a star vertex — including the vertex that also belongs to K4. Players 1 and 2 are assigned
to purchase one of the additional K4 vertices, respectively. With ε = 3ε′(k−2)1+3ε′ the first part of the theorem follows. For the
unweighted case we simply consider the game graph with all vertex costs equal to 1.
A similar analysis delivers the stated bound andproves the secondpart of the theorem,wherewe insist on the assumption
that G[Ei] is connected for each player. Here we drop the edges incident to the star center from E1 and E2, which results in
connected subgraphs for these players. Then we introduce two new players, and each one owns one of the dropped edges.
This results in every G[Ei] being connected. In addition, the Nash equilibria remain equivalent and the numerical value of
the price of stability is the same before and after the transformation (c.f. Section 2.3). However, the number of players k has
increased by 2, and thus the expression now reads k− 3− ε and k/4. 
Theorem 3. It is NP-hard to determine if
1. an unweighted vertex cover game
2. a weighted vertex cover game for 2 players
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, even if the graphs G[Ei] are forests.
Proof. We describe a reduction from 3SAT [25] for weighted games and then show how to adjust it for unweighted games.
Given an instance of 3SAT for every variable we introduce a gadget with a decision player. This player owns the edges of
two stars, denoted as the true star and the false star. The number of leaves of the (false) true star is equal to the number of
(negated) nonnegated occurrences of the variable in the clauses of the instance. The cost of each center vertex is equal to
the number of leaves, the cost of the leaves is equal to 1. In addition, we include a direct connection between the centers
of the stars. Furthermore, we use extended triangle gadgets depicted in Fig. 3. This gadget represents a game without a
Nash equilibrium, which can be shown along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1. At each leaf vertex of the stars we install
an extended triangle gadget. As no pair of gadgets is directly connected, this introduces only two new triangle players. The
leaf vertices of the stars become the u1-vertices of the gadgets. An example variable gadget is depicted in Fig. 4(a). For each
clause we introduce a new clause player. She owns a star of three edges connecting a new center vertex of cost 1 to three
extended triangle gadgets. We let the edges connect to the triangles of the false or true star of a variable gadget depending
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(a) A gadget for a variable occurring nonnegated in two clauses and negated in three clauses.
(b) A gadget for a clause.
Fig. 4. Variable and clause gadgets. The edges owned by triangle players are numbered, while edges owned by decision and clause player are unlabeled.
All vertices have cost 1, except for the two vertices in the extended triangles and the star centers.
on whether the variable appears negated or non-negated in the clause, respectively. In particular, the edges connect to the
v1-vertices of the extended triangles. As we have installed a sufficient number of these gadgets, we construct the network
such that no two edges of different clause players are incident at the same vertex. An example of a clause gadget is depicted
in Fig. 4(b).
Suppose there is a satisfying assignment for the instance of 3SAT. Thenwe construct an equilibriumas follows. If a variable
is true in the assignment, we pick the center vertex of her false star and all leaf vertices of the true star of its gadget to be
in the cover and let the decision player pay for it. All extended triangles incident to the false star then allow a stable cost
distribution, in which u2 and v1 are bought by the triangle players (see Fig. 3). In the case a variable is false we pick the leaf
vertices of the false star and adjust the assigned payments accordingly. As we have a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT
instance, this stabilizes at least one triangle gadget per clause. So each clause player has the chance to reduce the cost of the
vertices of the remaining two incident triangles by 0.5 each. The triangle players can then purchase the v1 and v2 vertices
in the remaining unstabilized gadgets (see Fig. 3). This assignment leaves no player an incentive to defect and forms a Nash
equilibrium.
Now suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium a decision player can either purchase one or both of the
star centers. Once she purchases the center of a star, she is not willing to contribute anything to the leaf vertices of the
star. Hence, if she does not contribute to the extended triangles attached to a star, the clause players must help the triangle
players to agree upon a cover. However, a clause player can only contribute a total cost of 1 to the triangle vertices, because
otherwise she can pick her star center as a cheaper alternative. The minimum cost reduction that she can achieve at every
v1 vertex of her incident triangle gadgets is 1/3, which is not enough to allow for a stable cost assignment in all triangles.
Hence, we need to have the decision players purchase the stars such that they trigger a stable cover in at least one extended
triangle from each clause. Furthermore, as they can only trigger a stable cover in triangle gadgets attached to one of their
stars, this naturally translates to a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance.
Finally, we use the transformations mentioned in Section 2 to obtain an equivalent game by merging all decision players
into one player and all clause players into another player. Note that we have introduced only two triangle players, whose
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edges form a partition of all edges from the extended triangle gadgets. The class of decision players shares endpoints only
with one of the triangle players. The same is true for clause players and the other triangle player. Hence, we can merge the
players again forming an equivalent game with only two players. This proves NP-hardness for weighted games and two
players, even in the case where the graphs induced by the set of edges of each player are forests.
For unweighted gameswe replace the extended triangles by the games on K4 depicted in Fig. 1(b). Vertices labeled u1 and
v1 indicate where to connect the decision and clause player stars, respectively. In the variable gadgets the star centers have
a cost of 1. In addition, we introduce a number of new players such that edges of the true and false stars are each owned by
a different player. For a clause player we now install two stars instead of one star. The stars have different centers, but leaf
nodes from the same K4 gadgets. Observe that in every variable gadget players in equilibrium contribute only to the leaves
of at most one star. Furthermore, a clause player must invest at least a cost of 1 to stabilize a K4 gadget. Hence, if at least
one gadget per clause is stabilized by the decision players, there exists a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, this condition
is also necessary, because the centers of the clause stars allow the clause players to stabilize at most two K4 gadgets. This
proves NP-hardness.
To show that the result holds even when the graphs G[Ei] are forests, we can remark that the two stars of a clause player
can be shared among two distinct players and the above reasoning is still correct. It can be checked that all graphs G[Ei]
in this game are forests. Note that in this case it can be checked in polynomial time whether a payment scheme is a Nash
equilibrium, because the minimum vertex cover problem can be solved in polynomial time on trees. Hence the problem
of finding whether a Nash equilibrium exists, when restricted to these instances, is also in NP and so is NP-complete. This
proves Theorem 3. 
4. Games with cheap Nash equilibria
The results in the previous section reveal that in general pure Nash equilibria can be absent, even from very simple
variants of the vertex cover game. In this section we outline two classes of set cover games that have Nash equilibria which
are even social optima.
We present two classes of set cover games that always exhibit optimal Nash equilibria: integral games, in which the
integrality gap of the integer programming relaxation is 1, and singleton games, in which each player owns only a single
edge. For singleton games it isNP-hard to find a social optimum.Hence,we study the existence and algorithmic computation
of (α, β)-NE. Formally, for (α, β)-NE the stability ratio α ≥ 1 specifies the violation of the Nash equilibrium inequality, and
β ≥ 1 is the approximation ratio of the social cost. We show that for singleton set cover games (1+ ε,O(log n))-NE can be
obtained in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0.
4.1. Integral games
In this subsection we turn to integral games, in which the integrality gap is 1. The integrality gap of a linear program for a
minimization problem is the worst-case ratio of the cost of the best integral solution over the cost of the best fractional
solution. Thus, in integral games even the linear relaxation of the underlying integer program has an optimal integral
solution.
Theorem 4. For any set cover game, in which the integrality gap of the underlying CIP is 1, the price of stability is 1 and an optimal
Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. We define the payments for the players using the optimal values of the dual variables. Then the total contribution of
the players suffices to pay exactly for the solution. Basically, the proof is an application of standard properties of LP-duality.
In the following we provide a detailed presentation of the specific steps.
Consider the LP-relaxation of the CIP derived by setting xS ≥ 0 instead of xS ∈ N. For the set cover game, the primal and
dual of the LP-relaxation can be formulated as
Min
∑
S∈S
c(S)xS Max
∑
e∈E
ye
s.t.
∑
S:e∈S
xS ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E s.t.
∑
e∈S
ye ≤ c(S) ∀S ∈ S
xS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ S ye ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E.
(3)
We can find the optimum primal solution x∗ and the optimum dual solution y∗ in polynomial time. Note that x∗ yields a
feasible cover C∗ by setting S ∈ C∗ if and only if x∗S = 1, because all x∗S ∈ {0, 1} due to an integrality gap of 1. Both x∗ for the
primal and y∗ for the dual have the same value by strong LP duality. Now assign each player to pay pi(S) = ∑e∈S∩Ei y∗ex∗S .
The resulting state p is a Nash equilibrium if every player plays a best response. We first show a necessary condition for this,
i.e., that C∗ is exactly paid for.
Lemma 2. In the state p defined above the players purchase the optimum cover exactly. The contribution of player i in p is exactly∑
S∈S pi(S) =
∑
e∈Ei y
∗
e .
Proof. At first, note that no player contributes to a set S 6∈ C∗, because x∗S = 0. For sets S ∈ C∗ we use complementary
slackness of the optimal solutions to the primal and dual linear programs, which yields x∗S · (c(S) −
∑
e∈S y∗e ) = 0 for any
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S ∈ S. If S ∈ C∗, then x∗S > 0 and thus
∑
e∈S y∗e = c(S). Hence, for such a set the total contribution is
k∑
i=1
pi(S) =
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈S∩Ei
y∗ex
∗
S =
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈S∩Ei
y∗e =
∑
e∈S
y∗e = c(S),
because w.l.o.g. we can assume that each element needs to be covered by exactly one player i. This shows that in p all sets
in C∗ get exactly paid for and no player contributes to sets S 6∈ C∗. This proves the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the lemmawe again use complementary slackness, i.e., that y∗e
∑
S∈S x
∗
S = 0. For every overcovered
element ewith
∑
S∈S x
∗
S > 1 this shows that y
∗
e = 0. Thus, the total contribution of player i in pi is∑
S∈S
pi(S) =
∑
S∈S
x∗S
∑
e∈S∩Ei
y∗e =
∑
e∈Ei
y∗e .
This proves the second part of the lemma. 
Now we prove that the strategy assignment pi is a best response against p−i for every player i.
Lemma 3. In the state p defined above every player plays a best response.
Proof. Lemma 2 implies that no player has a prohibitively large individual cost, because for each player a collection of sets
covering her elements is paid for. Thus, the individual cost of each player i is ci(p) = ∑S pi(S). To show the lemma we
consider for each player i the optimization problem of finding a strategy that minimizes the function ci(·, p−i). An optimum
solution p∗i to this problem is obviously a best response for player i. We will show that pi is such an optimum solution. This
proves that p is a Nash equilibrium.
For player i the optimization of ci(·, p−i) has to consider the contributions of other players as fixed. In particular, player i
only has to contribute exactly c ′(S) = c(S)−∑j6=i pj(S) to make set S become bought. Thus, in order to find a best response,
player i faces a reduced set cover problem, in which she must cover Ei with sets S of cost c ′(S). Using Lemma 2 we note that
c ′(S) ≥ 0 for every S ∈ S. An optimum solution C ′ to the reduced problem yields a best response p∗i (S) = c ′(S) if S ∈ C ′
and p∗i (S) = 0 otherwise. Consider the linear relaxation of the reduced problem and the dual:
Min
∑
S∈S
c ′(S)x′S Max
∑
e∈Ei
y′e
s.t.
∑
S:e∈S
x′S ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ Ei s.t.
∑
e∈S∩Ei
y′e ≤ c ′(S) ∀S ∈ S
x′S ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ S y′e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Ei.
(4)
Note that setting x′S = x∗S is feasible, because all elements in Ei were covered using x∗S . In addition, this solution results in the
original payments pi(S) and the cost ci(p) = ∑S∈S pi(S). Now consider setting y′e = y∗e in the dual. This is feasible for the
dual in (4), because
c ′(S) = c(S)−
∑
j6=i
pj(S) = c(S)−
∑
j6=i
∑
e∈S∩Ej
x∗Sy
∗
e = c(S)−
∑
e∈S−Ei
x∗Sy
∗
e
≥ c(S)−
∑
e∈S−Ei
y∗e ≥
∑
e∈S∩Ei
y∗e ,
and because y∗e was feasible for the original dual. In addition, it results in an objective function value of
∑
e∈Ei y
∗
e for the dual.
Due to LP-duality
∑
e∈Ei y
∗
e ≤
∑
S∈S c ′(S)x
′
S for every feasible x
′
S in the reduced primal. Lemma 2 and the observations above
imply equality for x′ = x∗. Hence, the solutions x∗ and y∗ have the same objective function value for the primal and dual
reduced problems. By strong duality this implies that x′S = x∗S is an integral optimal solution for the primal LP-relaxation
in (4). Hence, the cover C∗ is an optimum solution to the reduced problem. It results in the original payments pi(S), which
therefore are a best response for player i. This proves the lemma. 
The previous two lemmas show that it is possible to obtain a Nash equilibrium p, which exactly pays for the cost of an
optimum solution. This proves the theorem. 
For an illustration of the arguments consider a vertex cover gameon abipartite graphG, which is known tohave an integrality
gap of 1, see Fig. 5(a). To obtain an optimum dual solution one can employ a flow network using a standard construction by
adding a source and a sink vertex, see Fig. 5(b). Each of these two vertices is then connected by directed edges to all vertices
from one partition of the graph. The additional edges are directed away from the source to the sink and receive as capacity
the cost of the incident vertex fromG. All edges fromG receive an infinite capacity. Amaximum flow in this network yields an
optimum solution to the corresponding LP-dual of the vertex cover problem in G. The dual variables correspond to the flow
values on the edges. They can be used to construct a cost sharing of an optimum vertex cover. To show that this represents a
Nash equilibrium, Fig. 5(c) illustrates the reduced problem of finding a best response for player 2. For the reduced problem
the flow over her edges is still feasible, hence by LP-duality it lower bounds the optimum cover cost. As the flow also yields
a feasible strategy, player 2 plays a best response.
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a b c
Fig. 5. (a) A vertex cover game with an optimal Nash equilibrium. Edge numbering indicates player ownership, vertex numbering indicates cost. (b) Dual
variables correspond tomaximum flowvalues in an extended graph. It yields a cost sharing of an optimumcover indicated by filled vertices. Edgenumbering
represents top-down flow, labels of a vertex v are i :pi(v). (c) Player 2 plays a best response, because in the reduced problem the flow over her edges stays
feasible. Edge numbering represents top-down flow, vertex numbering indicates cost, filled vertices constitute an optimum cover.
4.2. Singleton games
For singleton set cover games, in which |Ei| = 1 for all players i, we prove a similar result as for integral games. The
proof, however, is along different lines. It does not immediately yield an efficient algorithm to compute an optimal Nash
equilibrium, however, it allows us to obtain (1+ ε,O(log n))-NE in time polynomial in n, k and ε−1, for any constant ε > 0.
Note that one can prove these results in a quite simple way. We can transform a singleton set cover game into an
equivalent single source connection game in a directed graph. The construction has three layers. In the first layer there
is exactly one terminal node for each player. In the second layer there is a node for each set. There is an edge between a
player node and a set node if and only if the element of the player is contained in this set. These edges all have a cost of 0.
Finally, the third layer is the source node, and a node for set S is connected to the source node with an edge of cost c(S).
It is obvious that solutions and Nash equilibria in this connection game correspond to solutions and Nash equilibria in the
singleton set cover game and vice versa. Hence, using the results of [6] it follows that optimal Nash equilibria exist and that
starting from an r-approximate solution we can construct a sequence of polynomially many steps improving the social cost
until reaching a (1+ ε, r)-NE. The results are stated in Theorems 5 and 6. For completeness, we also provide self-contained
proofs, which apply elementary arguments along the lines of [6] directly to singleton set cover games and highlight some
of the important main ideas.
Theorem 5. For singleton set cover games the price of stability is 1.
Proof. Consider a coverC and a set S ∈ C, and remove S fromC. Players that are still covered can be assignedno contribution
to S. Now consider the set of remaining players IS . For each player i ∈ IS independently consider the case, in which S is
removed, and consider her cheapest strategy to cover her element by a set different from S. Player imust purchase this new
set completely. We denote the cost of this set by cSi . A set is called stabilized if c(S) ≤
∑
i∈IS c
S
i . For a stabilized set S we
assign the players to pay pi(S) = c(S)c
S
i∑
i∈IS c
S
i
. This will not yield any incentives to remove payments.
A cover C is called exchange minimal if all sets are stabilized. Observe that an exchange minimal cover can be purchased
by a Nash equilibrium specified by the above given assignment of payments. If C is not exchange minimal, it is possible
to exchange an unstabilized set S with all the alternative sets used to define cSi for the players i ∈ IS . The total cost of this
alternative collection is at most
∑
i∈Is c
S
i . Such a local exchange step results in a new, strictly cheaper cover. Thus, if C = C∗,
then this is not possible. Hence, in C∗ all sets are stabilized and there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as C∗. 
The exchange step mentioned in the proof suggests that with an iterated application cover and payments converge to a
Nash equilibrium, which is cheaper than the starting cover. The problem with this approach is the running time, which
is not guaranteed to be polynomial in the input size. Here we borrow a trick from [6]. For computing exchanges we
artificially reduce the cost of the currently bought sets by a value κ such that each exchange operation of the proposed
algorithm guarantees a minimum improvement of the overall cost. For computing a starting solution any algorithm can be
used, in particular, we can apply the greedy O(log n)-approximation algorithm [44]. Using this algorithm we can compute
(1+ ε,O(log n))-NE in time polynomial in n, k and ε−1, for any constant ε > 0. Note that the greedy algorithm alone does
not necessarily output an exchange minimal cover.1
Theorem 6. For singleton set cover games a (1+ ε,O(log n))-NE can be computed in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0.
Proof. Consider the output C of any β-approximation algorithm for set cover. Starting from this cover we consider an
unstabilized set S and create a new cover C ′, in which we remove S. Then we let all the players with uncovered elements
1 Consider a game with 3 players and 3 sets: S1 = {e1, e2}, S2 = {e2, e3}, and S3 = {e1}, where player i owns element ei , for i = 1, 2, 3. The costs
are c(S1) = 2 and c(S2) = c(S3) = 1.5. The greedy algorithm first picks S1 and then S2 . However, e2 is overcovered, and player 1 can purchase S3 . So
cS11 = 1.5 < 2, and S1 is not stabilized.
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simultaneously switch to their best responses and add the corresponding sets to the cover. Let ε > 0 and define κ = ε′c(C)
(1+ε′)nβ .
We perform such an exchange step only if it improves the cost of the cover by at least κ . The algorithm terminates when no
further improving exchange steps are possible. Hence, in total the algorithm makes at most (1+ε)n
′β
ε
such exchange steps.
If the iteration has terminated, we assign players to purchase the cost of the cover as described in the proof of Theorem 5.
Note, however, that for each unit a cost of at most κ remains unpaid. Suppose in the final cover C ′ there are n′ bought sets.
This creates a remaining cost of at most κn′ to be paid for. Now each player is assigned a proportional share of pi(C
′)
c(C′)−n′κ of
all remaining costs, which might require a player to pay at sets not containing her elements. To establish the stability ratio
of (1+ ε′)we note that the increase for player i is only
pi(C ′)
κn′
c(C ′)− κ ≤
ε′c(C)pi(C ′)
α(1+ ε′)(1− ε)c(C ′) ≤ ε
′pi(C ′).
Hence, even if all additional payments of player i contribute to resource units she does not need for coverage, she cannot
decrease her payments by more than a factor of (1+ ε). This yields the result. 
A possible extension of this result is the case in which each player i has a threshold Mi and would rather stay uncovered if
her assigned payments exceed Mi. The presented algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium with a stability ratio arbitrarily close
to 1 for this case as well. Note that we can further generalize the result to games based on set multicover. It is, however, an
interesting open problem to adjust this procedure to cope with general covering games with general atf and bt .
5. Approximate equilibria
In the previous sections we saw that exact Nash equilibria exist only in special cases, in general they can be absent or
highly inefficient. In this sectionwe focus on (α, β)-NE for general vertex and set cover games. For set cover gameswe show
that (f, f)-NE can be computed in polynomial time. For vertex cover games we give an algorithm to divide the cost of any
optimum solution into payments representing a (2, 1)-NE. In addition, we prove a tight lower bound. We show that for any
given α < 2 and β ≥ 1, there is a vertex cover game without any (α, β)-NE.
Algorithm 1: (f, f)-NE for set cover games
pi(S)← 0 for all players i and sets S1
γi(e)← 0 for all players i and elements e2
while there is an uncovered element e do3
Let i be the player owning element e, and let γi(e)← minS3e c(S)4
Increase payments: pi(S)← pi(S)+ γi(e) for all S with e ∈ S5
Reduce set costs: c(S)← c(S)− γi(e) for all S with e ∈ S6
Add all purchased sets to the cover7
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 returns an (f, f)-NE for set cover games in polynomial time.
Proof. This is a variant of the well-known primal–dual f-approximation algorithm for minimum set cover for all elements
in E (see for instance [44, chapter 15]). It can clearly be implemented to run in polynomial time. For each element e it
simultaneously raises the contribution γi(e) to all covering sets until one set is bought. A player is assigned to pay all
contributions of her elements. It remains to be shown that the stability ratio is equal to f as well.
Intuitively, for an element e of player i we simultaneously raise the contribution γi(e) to each set S it can be covered
with. When player i deviates to a best response, she has to purchase the (remaining share of the) cost of at least one set that
contains e, and thus she has to pay γi(e) at least once. This yields a stability ratio of at most f.
More formally, after the execution of the algorithm, we consider the ith player and her best move taking into account the
payments of all other players j 6= i. We define the remaining costs c ′(S) for each set S, by letting c ′(S) = c(S)−∑j6=i pj(S).
We have to show that the sum of the payments of player i is not greater than f times the cost of the cheapest set cover of Ei
with respect to the costs c ′.
At first, we bound the payments of player i. The algorithm does not raise payments above costs, i.e, for any set S we have∑
j=1,2,...,k pj(S) ≤ c(S). In particular, player i does not overpay the cost c ′(S):
pi(S) ≤ c(S)−
∑
j6=i
pj(S) = c ′(S).
The algorithm simultaneously raises the contributions to all sets that contain an element e. The total contribution of player
i to a set S equals the
∑
e∈S γi(e), so pi(S) =
∑
e∈S∩Ei γi(e). Again, as no set is overpaid, this contribution is at most c
′(S)∑
e∈S∩Ei
γi(e) ≤ c ′(S).
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Now we turn to lower bounding the cost of a best response set cover C∗i of Ei, which has minimum cost with respect to the
cost function c ′. With the previous arguments, the cost of this cover is at least
c ′(C∗i ) =
∑
S∈C∗i
c ′(S) ≥
∑
S∈C∗i
∑
e∈S∩Ei
γi(e).
Since C∗i is a set cover of Ei, the charge γi(e) of each element e in Ei is counted at least once in the right-hand side above.
Hence, the left-hand side is at least
∑
e∈Ei γi(e), which allows one to conclude∑
S∈S
pi(S) =
∑
S∈S
∑
e∈S∩Ei
γi(e) ≤ f ·
∑
e∈Ei
γi(e) ≤ f · c ′(C∗i ).
This proves that for any best response player i has to pay for all e ∈ Ei the share γi(e), and the theorem follows. 
We remark here that our arguments are also implicitly used in [33], which considers dual payments and core solutions in
cooperative games. We could as well employ their results to show that the algorithm has a stability ratio of f. A proof along
these lines is given for the primal–dual Algorithm 3 for the UFL game below in Section 6.1.
For the case of vertex cover we can show that any socially optimum cover C∗ can always be purchased by a (2, 1)-NE.
Algorithm 2: (2, 1)-NE for vertex cover games
pi(v)← 0 for all players i and vertices v ∈ V1
γi(e)← 0 for all players i and edges e ∈ E2
E2 ← edges e covered twice in C∗3
Set all edges unmarked4
while there is an unmarked edge e ∈ E2 do5
Let i be the player owning the edge e = (u, v), and let γi(e)← min{c(u), c(v)}6
Increase payments: pi(u)← pi(u)+ γi(e), pi(v)← pi(v)+ γi(e)7
Reduce vertex costs: c(u)← c(u)− γi(e), c(v)← c(v)− γi(e)8
Mark all purchased vertices and their incident edges9
Create G′ = (V ′, E ′) and C ′ by removing all marked vertices and edges from G and C∗10
Find optimum y∗ for dual LP of G′ that corresponds to C ′ for primal LP (3)11
for all edges e ∈ E ′ do12
Let i be the player owning edge e = (u, v), and let γi(e)← y∗e13
Increase payments: pi(u)← pi(u)+ γi(e), pi(v)← pi(v)+ γi(e)14
pi(v)← 0 for all v 6∈ C∗15
Theorem 8. For every vertex cover game there is a (2, 1)-NE.
Proof. Consider a vertex cover game on a graph G with vertex costs of c(v) and an arbitrary optimal solution C∗. We
use Algorithm 2 to obtain a cost sharing of C∗ that is a (2, 1)-NE. It proceeds in two phases. The first phase is a run of
Algorithm 1 on a restricted set of edges. The second phase uses insights from Theorem 4 to assign the remaining costs. The
key observation is that after the first phase, the remaining graph G′ is bipartite, and C ′ is a minimum weight vertex cover
for G′.
Lemma 4. The graph G′ is bipartite. C ′ is a minimum weight vertex cover for G′.
Proof. In the first phase, the algorithm considers the set of edges E2 for which both incident vertices are in C∗. Note that
every odd cycle of G has at least one edge in E2. Thus, if E2 is empty, then G must be bipartite, and the lemma follows.
Otherwise, Algorithm 1 is called with E2, which assigns budgets γi(e) to e ∈ E2 and reduces the vertex costs accordingly.
In each step, the cost function c is adjusted, the costs of both the incident vertices of e are reduced by γi(e). As both these
vertices are in C∗, it remains an optimal cover after the adjustment. After considering all edges of E2, the algorithm removes
all purchased vertices with a cost of c(v) = 0 from C∗ and G, along with all the incident edges. This leaves C ′ optimal for
the resulting graph G′ and proves the second part of the lemma.
Due to the algorithm, all edges of E2 are marked and removed. This adjustment breaks every odd cycle of G. Hence, in C ′
every vertex v ∈ V ′ has a frequency of 1, and G′ is bipartite. 
For the remaining game given byG′we show in Theorem4 that there is an exact Nash equilibrium, inwhich the remaining
cost of C ′ is exactly paid for. It can be obtained by assigning the values of an optimal solution y∗ of the LP-dual as cost shares
to the edges. Instead, we create a budget for the edges e ∈ E ′ with γi(e) ← y∗e , which is offered to both incident vertices.
The next lemma shows that with this adjustment players will not overpay any cost c(v) and will contribute c(v) for every
vertex v ∈ C∗.
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Fig. 6. From left to right the edges owned by the players in the first, second, and third classes of players for K8 . The first and second classes consist of four
players each, and the third class of two players. Players in the first class own a single edge, while players in other classes own cycles of length 4.
Lemma 5. It holds that
k∑
i=1
∑
e:e=(u,v)
γi(e) ≤ c(v) for all v ∈ V and
k∑
i=1
∑
e:e=(u,v)
γi(e) ≥ c(v) for all v ∈ C∗.
Proof. Note that after the first phase, the first part of the lemma clearly holds. In the second phase, player i contributes
the dual payment pi(e) = γi(e) = y∗e for e ∈ E ′ to both end vertices. Feasibility of y∗ for the dual (3) means that∑
e:e=(u,v) y∗e ≤ c(v) for every vertex v, thus proving the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the lemma, a subset of vertices of C∗ is bought directly after the first phase. For the remaining
vertices and the remaining costs we use Theorem 4. It shows that the primal solution x∗ corresponding to C ′ under the
remaining costs is completely paid for by the dual cost shares y∗. 
This property allows one to use the proof idea of Theorem 7 to show that the stability ratio is bounded by 2. By dropping
all the payments to v 6∈ C∗ in the last step of Algorithm 2, we obtain a cost sharing of C∗ with a stability ratio at most 2. This
dropping step is not necessary for the bound on the stability ratio, it serves only to obtain a payment scheme that exactly
purchases C∗. This proves the theorem. 
For lower bounds on the ratios we note that any algorithm to find a (α, β)-NE in the set cover game can be used as
an approximation algorithm for the set cover problem with an approximation ratio min(α, β). This follows simply by
considering a game with one player. This observation can be combined with recent results on the complexity status of
the set cover problem. In particular, set cover cannot be approximated in polynomial time to a factor of o(log n) unless
P = NP [2]. Thus, a polynomial time algorithm for (O(log n),O(log n))-NE is all we can hope for. For the special case of the
minimum weighted vertex cover problem a recent result [34] suggests that if P 6= NP and the unique games conjecture
holds, there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm with a factor of 2− ε. Thus, in this case our algorithm delivers
the best factors we can hope for in polynomial time. Note that both bounds apply only to polynomial time computability.
We now show that in vertex cover games the frequency f = 2 is also a lower bound for the stability ratio, in amuch stronger
sense.
Theorem 9. For any α < 2 there is an unweighted vertex cover game without (α, β)-NE for any β ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof follows with a game on K4g with g ∈ N. We assume the vertices are numbered v1 to v4g and distribute the
edges of the game to 2g2+g players in g+1 classes as follows. In the first class there are 2g players. Every player i from this
class owns only a single edge (vi, v2g+i). Then, for each integer j ∈ [1, g − 1] there is another class of 2g players. A player
i in one of the classes owns a cycle of four edges (vi, vi+j), (vi+j, v2g+i), (v2g+i, v2g+i+j) and (v2g+i+j, vi). Finally, there are g
players in the last class. Each player i in this class also owns a cycle of four edges (vi, vg+i), (vg+i, v2g+i), (v2g+i, v3g+i) and
(v3g+i, vi). See Fig. 6 for g = 2 and the distribution of the 10 players into 3 classes on K8.
It is well-known that any feasible vertex cover of a complete graph is composed of either all or all but one vertices. For
a cover of all 4g vertices we can simply drop the payments to one vertex. This reduces the payment for at least one player.
In addition, it only increases the cost of some of the deviations as the players must now purchase the uncovered vertex in
total. Hence, the stability ratio of the resulting payment scheme can only decrease. Hence, the minimum stability ratio is
obtained by purchasing 4g − 1 vertices.
So w.l.o.g. consider a cover of 4g−1 vertices including all but vertex v4g . Note that some player subgraphs do not include
v4g , and there are only two types of player subgraphs — a single edge or a cycle of length 4. First, consider a player subgraph
that consists of a single edge and both end vertices are covered. If the player contributes to the cost of the incident vertices,
she can drop the maximum of both contributions. Thus, if she contributes more than 0 to at least one of the vertices, her
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Fig. 7. Players that include v8 in their subtree. Numbering of players as described in the text. Edges labels indicate player ownership.
incentive to deviate is at least a factor of 2. Second, consider a player subgraph that consists of a cycle of length four. Label
the four included vertices along a Euclidean tour with u1, u2, u3 and u4. Let the contributions of the player to uj be xj for
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. To optimally deviate froma given payment scheme, the player picks one of the possibleminimum
vertex covers {u1, u3} or {u2, u4} and removes all payments outside this cover. A factor of r bounding her incentives to deviate
must thus obey the inequalities
∑4
j=1 xj ≤ r(x1 + x3) and
∑4
j=1 xj ≤ r(x2 + x4). Note that a player might also contribute
to vertices outside her cycle. These additional contributions, however, would unnecessarily tighten the bounds and require
an increase in r . Hence, in order to find the minimum r that is achievable we assume that the player contributes only to
vertices inside her subgraph. Summing the two inequalities yields (2− r)∑4j=1 xj ≤ 0, so either her overall contribution is
0 or r ≥ 2. To derive a payment scheme with a stability ratio of strictly less than 2, all 4g − 1 vertices in the cover must be
purchased by the 2g players whose subgraph includes v4g .
For the rest of the proof we will concentrate on these 2g players. We will refer to player i, if she includes vi in her
subgraph, for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1. All these players own cycle subgraphs. The player that owns the edge (v2g , v4g) is labeled
player 2g . See Fig. 7 for an example on K8. We denote the contribution of player i to vertex vj by pij for all i = 1, . . . , 2g and
j = 1, . . . , 4g − 1. Observe that for each player the set {v2g , v4g} forms a feasible vertex cover. To achieve a stability ratio r ,
we must ensure that each player can only reduce her payments by a factor of at most r when switching to this cover. In the
case of player 2g only {v2g} is needed, so we must ensure that she can reduce her payments by at most r when dropping all
payments but p2g,2g . As v4g is not part of the purchased cover its cost of 1 must be purchased completely by a player that
strives to use it in a deviation. This yields the following set of 2g inequalities:
4g−1∑
j=1
pij ≤ r(pi,2g + 1) for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1
4g−1∑
j=1
p2g,j ≤ rp2g,2g .
We again strive to obtain the minimum ratio r that is possible. Note that in the minimum case no vertex gets overpaid, i.e.,∑2g
i=1 pij = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , 4g − 1. Using this property in the sum of all the inequalities gives
4g − 1 =
4g−1∑
j=1
2g∑
i=1
pij ≤ r
(
2g − 1+
2g∑
i=1
pi,2g
)
≤ 2gr,
which finally yields r ≥ 2− 12g . This proves that in the presented game no (α, β)-NE with α < 2− 12g exists. Thus, for every
ε > 0 we can pick g ≥ (2ε)−1, which then yields a game without (2− ε, β)-NE for any β ≥ 1. 
Although we did not consider all deviation possibilities, this lower bound is the best we can get for the presented example
games. The following payment scheme is for the players including v4g in their subgraph. Player i purchases 1− 12g of vertices
vi and v2g+i for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1. Player 2g purchases v2g completely and the remaining 12g at every other vertex.
It would be interesting to see if this lower bound is connected to the integrality gap of vertex cover. Such a relation
exists for approximate budget balanced core solutions in the cooperative game [33]. In a core solution each possible player
coalition S contributes nomore than the cost of a minimum vertex cover for S. In our game, however, players make concrete
strategic investments at the vertices, which alter the cost of the minimum cover for other players. In particular, our result
is mainly due to the fact that the majority of players is sufficiently overcovered leaving only a small number of contributing
players. This makes a relation to the integrality gap seem more complicated to establish.
Some classes of the vertex cover problem can be approximated to a better extent. For example, there is a PTAS for the
vertex cover problem on planar graphs [8]. It is therefore natural to explore whether for planar games we can find covers
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with approximation and stability ratio arbitrarily close 1. The bad news is that in general there are also limits to the existence
of cheap approximate Nash equilibria even for planar games. In particular, Theorem 9 provides a lower bound of 1.5 on the
stability ratio for unweighted planar games. Forweighted planar games there is an additional trade-off between the stability
and approximation ratios that yields a stability ratio close to 2 for socially near-optimal covers.
Corollary 1. There is a planar unweighted vertex cover game without (α, β)-NE for any α < 1.5 and β ≥ 1. For any β < 76
there is a planar weighted vertex cover game without (α, β)-NE for α < 2/(2β − 1).
Proof. With the planarity of K4 and Theorem 9 the first part follows. For the second part consider a game from Fig. 1(a) with
ε > 0. Here every algorithmwith β < 2+ε2 returns C
∗ = {v1, v2}. How good can this cover be in terms of the stability ratio?
If player 1 contributes, she can always drop payments to the one vertex to which she contributes the most. This shows that
if her contribution is greater than 0, her deviation incentive is at least a factor of 2. If we assign player 2 to purchase the
whole cover, this delivers α = 21+ε < 2 for all ε > 0. Hence, once an algorithm returns (α, β)-NE with β < 2+ε2 , then for
this game any such cover has α > 21+ε . Solving for ε we get the bound, which proves the second part of the corollary. 
So the better an algorithm is required to be in terms of social cost, the more it allows for a selfish improvement by a factor
close to 2. Note that these lower bounds apply directly to any algorithm with or without polynomial running time.
6. Facility location games
In this section we extend our model to facility location games. We will first restrict ourselves to one of the most simple
variants, the uncapacitated facility location problem. It can be stated as follows. A complete bipartite graphG = (T∪F , T×F)
with vertex sets F of nf facilities and T of nt clients or terminals is given. Each facility f ∈ F has nonnegative opening costs c(f ),
and for each terminal t and each facility f there is a nonnegative connection cost c(t, f ). The goal is to connect each terminal
to exactly one opened facility at minimum total cost. The classic integer programming formulation of the UFL problem is
due to Balinski [9].
Min
∑
f∈F
c(f )yf +
∑
t∈T
c(t, f )xtf
subject to
∑
f∈F
xtf ≥ 1 ∀t ∈ T
yf − xtf ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , f ∈ F
yf , xtf ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T , f ∈ F .
(5)
Note that even for this simple version the integer program is not a CIP, as there are negative coefficients in the constraints.
Nevertheless, it is possible to construct a non-cooperative game based on an UFL instance as follows. Each of the k non-
cooperative players holds a set Ti ⊂ T of terminals and insists on satisfying the constraints corresponding to her terminals
t ∈ Ti. He /she offers money to the connection and opening costs. In particular, she picks as a strategy a pair of two payment
functions pci : T × F → R+0 and poi : F → R+0 that specify her offers to the connection and opening costs. If the total offers of
all players exceed the cost of a connection or facility, the corresponding variable is raised to 1. In this case the connection or
facility is considered bought or opened, respectively. All players can use bought connections and opened facilities for free,
no matter whether they contribute to the cost or not. The definitions of payment scheme, Nash equilibrium and (α, β)-NE
follow directly. Furthermore, it is possible to apply some of the simplifications observed in Section 2 for covering games.
Hence, for the rest of this paper, we will assume that the sets Ti form a partition of the terminal set T . In particular, this
means that in a Nash equilibrium connection costs are not shared between players.
6.1. Exact and approximate Nash equilibria
In this section we present results on exact and approximate Nash equilibria for the metric UFL game. For lower bound
constructions wemainly use the following transformation to turn a vertex cover gamewith a graph G = (V , E) into ametric
UFL game. The set of facilities F is given by the vertex set V of the graph G. For the opening costs c(f ) = c(v). The terminal
set T is given by the edge set E. For each terminal t corresponding to (u, v) ∈ E we specify the connection costs for the edges
between t and the two facilities corresponding to u and v. These edges will be termed basic edges, as we explicitly specify
the connection cost. All other edge costs are given by the shortest path metric over basic edges.
Even in themetric UFL game the price of anarchy is exactly k. The lower bound is derived by an instancewith two facilities,
f1 with cost k and f2 with cost 1. Each player i has one terminal ti, and all connection costs are ε > 0. The argumentation
follows essentially Theorem 1. Note that also the upper bound of k is easily translated to metric and non-metric UFL games.
To derive a bound on the price of stability, we note that there are games without Nash equilibria.
Lemma 6. There is a metric UFL game without Nash equilibria.
Proof. The proof follows by translating the game of Fig. 1(a) into a metric UFL game. We set the cost of vertex u to 1.5 and
the cost of each basic edge to 1. Note that in equilibrium no player will consider paying a connection cost of 3 to connect a
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Fig. 8. Construction ofmetric UFL games, in which the price of stability is arbitrarily close to k−2. Filled vertices are facilities, empty vertices are terminals.
Numerical labels of terminals indicate player ownership, labels of facilities indicate opening costs. All basic solid edges have cost 1, all basic dashed edges
cost ε. All other edge costs are given by the shortest path metric.
terminal to a facility, because it is always possible to open another facility and connect the terminal with a total cost of less
than 3. Hence, in equilibrium only basic edges are bought and the total connection cost is 3. Then the opened facilities must
resemble a feasible vertex cover for the original instance. This proves the lemma. 
We can use this game to make the price of stability as large as k− 2.
Theorem 10. There is a metric UFL game with price of stability at least k− 2.
Proof. Consider the game in Fig. 8. This game is in essence obtained by transformation from the game in Fig. 2. In addition
to the transformation there are two major adjustments to be made. First, instead of the unweighted game in Fig. 1(b) we
attach the game in Fig. 1(a) to the star of the players 3, . . . , k. Second, after the transformation we must adjust opening and
connection costs to ensure the property that in equilibrium no non-basic edges are purchased. It is easy to verify that for the
presented game this property holds. The argumentation then follows the proof of Theorem 2. In particular, there can be no
Nash equilibriumpurchasing the facility in the center of the star composed by players 3, . . . , k, because in this case players 1
and 2must agree on opening some of the cheap facilities. This is not possible due to Lemma 6. If, however, the center facility
of the star is not bought, each of the players 4, . . . , k pays the connection and opening costs of the corresponding leaf facility
resulting in a total cost of 1 + ε for each player. Player 3 can connect to the cheap facility and contribute a cost of ε to the
opening cost. Then player 1 can contribute the remaining cost of ε/2 and connect her 2 terminals at a cost of 2ε. Player 2
purchases one of the facilities of cost ε and the connection to it. This yields a Nash equilibrium of cost (k− 2)(1+ ε)+ 4.5ε.
The social optimum solution has a cost of 1 + (k + 3)ε. Thus, if ε tends to 0, the lower bound becomes arbitrarily close to
k− 2. 
The next theorem concerns the hardness of deciding Nash equilibrium existence.
Theorem 11. It is NP-hard to decide if a metric UFL game has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The theorem follows directly by a transformation from the vertex cover game. If we transform the variable and clause
gadgets of Fig. 4 using a cost of 1 for each basic edge, then every non-basic edge has cost at least 3. Thus, in equilibrium no
non-basic edge is purchased, as a player can always open another facility and connect a terminal with a basic edge with
smaller cost. Thus, the set of opened facilities in equilibrium resembles a feasible vertex cover. This proves the theorem. 
Thus, exact Nash equilibria can be quite costly, may not exist, and their existence is hard to decide. For some classes of
games, however, there is a cheap Nash equilibrium. In particular, results in [6] can be used to show that UFL games with a
single terminal per player allow for an iterative improvement procedure similar to the one presented in Section 4.2. Hence,
the price of stability is 1, and (1+ε, 1.5)-NE can be found using a recent approximation algorithm [10] to compute a starting
solution. In addition, there is another class of games with cheap equilibria that can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 12. For any metric UFL game, in which the underlying UFL problem has an integrality gap 1, the price of stability is 1,
and an optimal Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof works by repeating and adjusting the ideas in the proof of Theorem 4. Reconsider the IP formulation (5)
and its corresponding LP-relaxation obtained by allowing yf , xtf ≥ 0. The integrality gap is assumed to be 1, so the optimum
solution (x∗, y∗) to (5) is optimal for the relaxation. Its dual is
Min
∑
t∈T
γt
subject to γt − δtf ≤ c(t, f ) ∀t ∈ T , f ∈ F∑
t∈T
δtf ≤ c(f ) ∀f ∈ F
γt , δtf ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , f ∈ F .
(6)
We can find the optimum dual solution (γ ∗, δ∗) in polynomial time. It has the same value as (x∗, y∗) for (5). Now assign
each player to pay poi (f ) = y∗f
(∑
t∈Ti δ
∗
tf
)
to the opening cost of each facility f . By complementary slackness this assignment
1872 J. Cardinal, M. Hoefer / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1855–1876
purchases every opened facility exactly. In addition, if a terminal t is connected to a facility f then x∗tf = 1 and γt − δtf ≤
c(t, f ) is tight. As x∗ is integral, for each terminal t we have x∗tf = 1 for exactly one opened facility f , and we can let the
owning player i contribute pci (t, f ) = x∗tf (γ ∗t − δ∗tf ) to c(t, f ) for every facility f . This assignment exactly pays for all opened
facilities and established connections. In addition, with a similar analysis as in Lemma 2 using complementary slackness it
is possible to show that
∑
f∈F p
o
i (f )+
∑
t∈Ti p
c
i (t, f ) =
∑
t∈Ti γ
∗
t .
To show that p = (po, pc) is a set of best responses we consider the optimization problem of finding a best response for a
single player i and her set of terminals Ti. We again construct a reduced problem by reduction of costs through contributions
in po−i. This yields new costs c ′(f ) = c(f ) −
∑
j6=i p
o
j (f ). Note that in p no player contributes to the connection costs of a
different player, thus c ′(t, f ) = c(t, f ). We can formulate the reduced problem as an integer programwith variables (x′, y′),
relax this program, and consider the LP-dual of the relaxation with variables (γ ′, δ′). Now consider as a primal solution the
reduced optimal solution, i.e., y′f = y∗f and x′tf = x∗tf for all t ∈ Ti and f ∈ F . This is still feasible, because (x∗, y∗) satisfies the
connection requirements of all t ∈ Ti. Also, it results in the original payments of poi (f ) and pci (t, f ) and thus in a total cost of∑
f∈F p
o
i (f ) +
∑
t∈Ti p
c
i (t, f ) for the primal. Now consider the LP-dual for the reduced problem and solutions γ
′
t = γ ∗t and
δ′tf = δ∗tf for all f ∈ F and t ∈ Ti. These solutions are feasible for the facility constraints in the reduced dual, because they
were feasible for the facility constraints in the original dual:
c ′(f ) = c(f )−
∑
j6=i
poj (f ) = c(f )− y∗f
∑
t∈T−Ti
δ∗tf ≥
∑
t∈Ti
y∗f δ
∗
tf .
The same holds trivially for the connection constraints, because c ′(t, f ) = c(t, f ). This results in a total objective function
value of
∑
t∈Ti γ
′
t . By LP-duality we know that
∑
t∈Ti γ
′
t ≤
∑
f∈F c ′(f )y
′
f +
∑
t∈Ti c(t, f )x
′
tf for every feasible solution (x
′, y′)
to the primal. For (x∗, y∗)we use observations above to show equality. Hence, (x∗, y∗) and (γ ∗, δ∗) have the same value for
the primal and dual LPs of the reduced problem. Thus, (x∗, y∗) yields an optimum solution for the reduced problem. This
proves that pi = (poi , pci ) is a best response for player i. Hence, p is a Nash equilibrium with optimum social cost. 
For general games we consider approximate Nash equilibria.
Theorem 13. For the metric UFL game there is an algorithm to derive (3, 3)-NE in polynomial time.
Proof. In the following algorithm we denote a terminal by t , a facility by f , and the player owning t by it . The algorithm
raises budgets for each terminal, which are offered for purchasing the connection and opening costs. Facilities are opened
if the opening costs are covered by the total budget offered, and if they are located sufficiently far away from other opened
facilities.
Algorithm 3: Primal–dual algorithm for (3, 3)-NE
In the beginning all terminals are unconnected, all budgets Bt are 0, and all facilities are closed. Raise budgets of
unconnected terminals at the same rate until one of the following events occurs. We denote the current budget of
unconnected terminals by B. We call a terminal t tight with a facility f if Bt ≥ c(t, f ).
1. An unconnected terminal t goes tight with an opened facility f .
In this case set t connected to f and assign player it to pay pcit (t, f ) = c(t, f ).
2. For a facility f not yet definitely closed the sum of the budgets of unconnected
and indirectly connected terminals t pays for the opening and connection costs:∑
t max(Bt − c(t, f ), 0) = c(f ). Then stop raising the budgets of the
unconnected tight terminals. Also,
(a) if there are opened facility f ′ and terminal t ′ with c(t ′, f )+ c(t ′, f ′) ≤ 2B,
set f definitely closed and all unconnected terminals t tight with f
indirectly connected to f ′.
(b) Otherwise open f and set all terminals, which are tight with f and not
yet directly connected to some other facility, directly connected to f .
For each such terminal assign player it to pay pcit (t, f ) = c(t, f ) and poit (f ) = Bt − c(t, f ).
In the end connect all indirectly connected terminals to the closest opened facility and assign the corresponding
players to pay for the connection cost.
For the approximation ratio of 3 we note that the algorithm is a primal–dual method for the UFL problem [38,41].
For the analysis of the stability ratio consider a single player i and her payments. Note that the algorithm stops raising
the budget of a terminal by the time it becomes directly or indirectly connected.Wewill first show that for the final budgets∑
t∈Ti Bt is a lower bound on the cost of any deviation for player i. For any terminal t we denote by f (t) the facility t is
connected to in the calculated solution.
Lemma 7. c(t, f ) ≥ Bt for any terminal t and any opened facility f 6= f (t).
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Proof. First suppose there is such a facility for a terminal that is indirectly connected at the end of the algorithm. This is a
contradiction, because then the terminal would have been tight to an opened facility during the run of the algorithm. If this
happens, t gets directly connected to f .
Otherwise suppose t is directly connected to f (t). Then, f and f (t) are within a distance of 2Bt , which is too close for
both of them to be open. As t is directly connected to f (t), either f (t) or both f and f (t) are opened at a time where
the current budget B ≥ Bt . If f is opened first and the algorithm tries to open f (t), then with t there is a terminal
c(t, f ) + c(t, f (t)) = 2Bt ≤ 2B. Thus, f (t) must stay closed. Otherwise, if the algorithm tries to open f after f (t), then
f must be closed for the same reason. 
Hence, if a player has a deviation that improves upon Bt , she must open a new facility and connect some of her clients to it.
By opening a new facility, however, the player is completely independent of the cost contributions of other players. Similar
to [41] we can argue that the final budgets yield a feasible solution for the dual of the LP-relaxation. Hence, they form a 3-
approximately budget balanced core solution for the cooperative game [33]. Now suppose there is a deviation for a player,
which opens a new facility f and connects a subset of her terminals Tf to f thereby reducing her cost to below the budgets.
Then the cost of c(f )+∑t∈Tf c(t, f ) <∑t∈Tf Bt . This, however, wouldmean that the coalition formed by Tf in the coalitional
game has a way to improve upon their budgets, which is a contradiction to Bt having the core-property. Hence, we know
that
∑
t∈Ti Bt is a lower bound on every deviation cost. Finally, note that for every directly connected terminal t ∈ Ti player i
pays Bt . A terminal t becomes indirectly connected only if it is unconnected and tight to a facility f by the time f is definitely
closed. f becomes definitely closed only if there is another previously opened facility f ′ at distance 2Bt from f . Hence, there
is an edge c(t, f ′) ≤ 3Bt by the metric inequality. So in the end player i pays at most 3Bt when connecting an indirectly
connected terminal to the closest opened facility. This establishes the bound on the stability ratio. 
Our proof uses results for cooperative games to lower bound the deviation possibilities of a player i that are not influenced
by the contribution of other players than i. Note that it is possible to derive a self-contained proof as for Algorithm 1 before.
Finally, we discuss some observations regarding lower bounds on the stability ratio. There is no polynomial time
algorithm for theUFLproblemwith an approximation ratio of 1.463unlessNP ⊂ DTIME(nO(log log n)) [27]. Again, this transfers
to a lower bound for the stability ratio in terms of polynomial time computability. In addition there is a game giving a
constant lower bound r such that the stability ratio α > r in every approximate Nash equilibrium. Reconsider the UFL game
obtained from transforming the vertex cover game of Fig. 1(a). The structure of the graph is fixed as well as all connection
costs. Hence, as there is no exact Nash equilibrium, there must be a constant r > 1 such that any cost distribution of any
feasible solution can represent only a (α, β)-NE with α > r . By appropriate adjustment of edge costs we can obtain a small
bound of r = 1.097, but the proof is by tedious case analysis and therefore omitted.
6.2. Connection-restricted facility location games
This section extends the UFL game to connection-restricted facility location (CRFL) problems as considered in [26].
Instead of the constraints yf − xtf ≥ 0 there is for each facility f a set Pf of feasible subsets S of terminals that can be
connected simultaneously to f . This formulation allows for instance capacity, quota, or incompatibility constraints and
thus encompasses several well-known generalizations of the problem. For these games some of the previous results can
be extended to hold. In particular, lower bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability follow simply by extension. The price
of anarchy can be unbounded, as there might be infeasible assignments, which no player can resolve unilaterally.2 In the
following we show that for subclasses of these games cheap Nash equilibria exist in the CRFL game. We restrict to closed
CRFL games (CCRFL games) in which the sets Pf are downward closed. In particular, we assume that for S ∈ Pf and S ′ ⊆ S
it holds S ′ ∈ Pf . Note that this class is still quite general, as it includes capacity or incompatibility constraints. An exception
are quota constraints, which in general do not yield closed games.
Theorem 14. For any CCRFL game, in which a partially conic relaxation of the underlying CRFL problem has integrality gap 1, the
price of stability is 1.
Proof. We can formalize the CRFL problem by an integer program as follows:
Min
∑
f∈F
c(f )yf +
∑
t∈T
c(t, f )xtf
subject to
∑
f∈F
xtf ≥ 1 ∀t ∈ T
(yf , x1f , . . . , xnt f ) ∈ Pf ∀f ∈ F
yf , xtf ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T , f ∈ F .
(7)
Here Pf = {(0, . . . , 0)} ∪ {(1, χS)|S ⊂ T feasible for f } ⊂ {0, 1}nt+1, and χS denotes the characteristic vector of the
subset S.
2 Consider two players 1 and 2 owning terminal t1 and t2 , respectively. There are two facilities f1 and f2 , for which Pf1 = {{t1}} and Pf2 = {{t2}}. All
opening and connection costs are 1. Suppose t1 pays for c(f2) and c(t1, f2) and t2 for c(f1) and c(t2, f1). Then both player constraints are violated, and they
both have infinite cost. However, no player can remove payments of others, so no player can unilaterally obtain a feasible solution. Therefore, the state is
a Nash equilibrium of unbounded cost.
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Following the argumentation in [26] it is possible to use the conic hull of the sets Pf to derive a linear relaxation:
Min
∑
f∈F
c(f )yf +
∑
t∈T
c(t, f )xtf
subject to
∑
f∈F
xtf ≥ 1 ∀t ∈ T
(yf , x1f , . . . , xnt f ) ∈ cone(Pf ) ∀f ∈ F .
(8)
For this program a dual can be given by
Max
∑
t∈T
γt
subject to
∑
t∈S
γt ≤ c(f )+
∑
t∈S
c(t, f ) ∀f ∈ F , S ∈ Pf . (9)
Now we will apply similar arguments given before in Theorems 4 and 12. An integral optimum solution (x∗, y∗) to the LP
relaxation represents a partition of the terminal set T into a collection of feasible sets S∗f ∈ Pf , one for each facility f . We will
again construct a set of strategies p = (po, pc) for the players such that γ ∗t from the corresponding optimum dual solution is
the total payment of a terminal t . For player iwe assign an amount pci (t, f ) = c(t, f ) as connection cost to f with t ∈ S∗f . For
the opening costs poi (f ) =
∑
t∈Sf ∩Ti γ
∗
t − c(t, f ). For a player i this yields
∑
f∈F p
o
i (f ) +
∑
t∈Ti p
d
i (t, f ) =
∑
t∈Ti γ
∗
t as total
payment. W.l.o.g. we again assume that the sets Ti are mutually disjoint. Thus, the total payment of all players is
∑
t∈T γ ∗t .
We first show that for all t ∈ S∗f we have γ ∗t ≥ c(t, f ). Thus, for every player i and every facility f we have poi (f ) ≥ 0.
In addition, we note that the solution is exactly paid for. This shows that state p = (po, pc) is feasible and all costs of the
solution are exactly paid for.
Lemma 8. For the optimum dual solution it holds γ ∗t ≥ c(t, f ) for every t ∈ S∗f . In addition, for every f ∈ F we have∑
t∈S∗f γ
∗
t = c(f )+
∑
t∈S∗f c(t, f ).
Proof. The proof of the first part follows using the closed property of the sets Pf . Note that by strong LP-duality we have∑
t∈Ti γ
∗
t =
∑
f∈F c(f )y
∗
f +
∑
t∈T x
∗
tf , i.e., the total contribution of all players exactlymatches the cost of the optimumsolution
that is to be paid for. Suppose for contradiction that for some facility f there is a terminal t ′ ∈ S∗f with γ ∗t ′ < c(t ′, f ).
First suppose that
∑
t∈S∗f γ
∗
t = c(f )+
∑
t∈S∗f c(t, f ). In this case, consider the set of players S
∗
f − {t ′}, for which we have∑
t∈S∗f ,t 6=t ′ γ
∗
t > c(f )+
∑
t∈S∗f −{t ′} c(t, f ). We have a CCRFL, thuswe know that S
∗
f −{t ′} ∈ Pf . This is a contradiction, because
γ ∗ would violate the corresponding dual constraint.
Now suppose that
∑
t∈S∗f γ
∗
t < c(f ) +
∑
t∈S∗f c(t, f ). Because the primal and dual solutions have the same value, there
must be at least one facility f ′ and a set of players S∗f ′ ∈ Pf ′ with
∑
t∈S∗
f ′
γ ∗t > c(f ) +
∑
t∈S∗
f ′
c(t, f ′). This, however, again
violates the corresponding constraint in the dual. This proves the first part of the lemma. Note that the last argument also
proves the second part of the lemma. 
We now show that p is a collection of best responses. Consider a player i and the problem of finding a best response
strategy. This reduces to optimally solving the facility location problem for terminals t ∈ Ti under the fixed payments p−i
of other players. Similarly to the previous theorems this yields a reduced problem to cover terminals t ∈ Ti via allowed
connections to open facilities, where opening costs are c ′(f ) = c(f )−∑j6=i poj (f ) for each f ∈ F . Due to Lemma 8 we again
have c ′(t, f ) = c(t, f ) for each f ∈ F and t ∈ Ti as in Theorem12. For the reduced problemwemust not only fix the payments
but also the connectivity conditions of all other players than i. We need to check these conditions to evaluate whether a
unilateral deviation for player i is feasible or not. A terminal t ∈ T −Ti is connected to facility f if pci (t, f ) ≥ c(t, f ). Thus, the
set of necessarily connected terminals of players j 6= i for facility f in state p can be given by Nf = {t ∈ T − Ti | x∗tf = 1}. The
feasible subsets at f for player i reduce to all subsets of Ti that can be combined with Nt to yield a set in Pf . More formally,
we get P ′f = {S ∈ Pf ∩ Ti | S ∈ Pf ,Nt ⊆ S}, which is the set of feasible subsets in the reduced problem. A conic relaxation of
the corresponding integer program can be given by
Min
∑
f∈F
c ′(f )y′f +
∑
t∈Ti
c ′(t, f )x′tf
subject to
∑
f∈F
x′tf ≥ 1 ∀t ∈ Ti
(y′f , x′) ∈ cone(P ′f ) ∀f ∈ F .
(10)
For this program the dual can be given by
Max
∑
t∈Ti
γ ′t
subject to
∑
t∈S
γ ′t ≤ c ′(f )+
∑
t∈S
c(t, f ) ∀f ∈ F , S ∈ P ′f .
(11)
J. Cardinal, M. Hoefer / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1855–1876 1875
As done previously, we use (x∗, y∗) as candidate solution for the reduced problem. Note that it is trivially feasible, because
it yields a feasible solution for the original problem and was used to define P ′f . Also, it results in ci(p) =
∑
f∈F p
o
i (f ) +∑
t∈Ti p
c
i (t, f ) as objective function value. For the dual we again use γ
′
t = γ ∗t . This choice of γ ′t is feasible, because for every
S ∈ P ′f we have S ∪ Nt ∈ Pf and
c ′(f )+
∑
t∈S
c(t, f ) = c(f )−
∑
j6=i
poj (f )+
∑
t∈S
c(t, f )
= c(f )−
(∑
t∈Nt
γ ∗t − c(t, f )
)
+
∑
t∈S
c(t, f )
= c(f )+
∑
t∈S∪Nt
c(t, f )−
∑
t∈Nt
γ ∗t
≥
∑
t∈S
γ ∗t ,
because γ ∗t was feasible for the original dual.We get
∑
t∈Ti γ
∗
t =
∑
f∈F p
o
i (f )+
∑
t∈Ti p
c
i (t, f ) as dual objective function value,
which shows that (x∗, y∗) represents an optimum solution to the reduced problem. Thus, pi = (poi , pci ) is a best response for
player i. This proves that p is a Nash equilibrium of optimum cost. 
If we can optimize over the cones in polynomial time we can also compute the best Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
In particular, this is the case if the cone can be described by a polynomial number of inequalities.
Finally, we observe that there are singleton CCRFL games (in which every player has exactly one terminal) without any
pure Nash equilibrium. In particular, insights from [6] and Theorem 5 that prove the existence of optimal Nash equilibria
cannot be extended to this class of games. For example, consider a game with two clients T = {t1, t2} as players.3 There are
two facilities f1 and f2. All the connection costs are 0. The opening costs are c(f1) = 2.2 and c(f2) = 1. The set Pf1 = 2T ,
whereas f2 has a capacity constraint of xt1f2 + xt2f2 ≤ 1, which yields Pf2 = {{t1}, {t2}}. In every feasible solution f1 must be
open, but f1 can never be paid for in a Nash equilibrium. Note, however, that the integrality gap of the underlying problem
is not 1, because we can assign each player fractionally xt1f1 = xt2f1 = xt1f2 = xt2f2 = 0.5 and open both facilities to a degree
of y1 = y2 = 0.5. This satisfies all constraints and yields a total cost of 1.6, which is strictly less than for any feasible integral
solution.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a general class of cost sharing games for non-cooperative agents based on combinatorial
optimization problems. Exact Nash equilibria in these games are often absent, costly, and their existence is hard to decide.
Nevertheless, there are non-trivial classes of games that even allow optimal exact Nash equilibria, e.g., in case agents have
a single element or the integrality gap of an underlying linear programming formulation is 1. For many games we provided
efficient algorithms to compute approximate Nash equilibria with a small constant stability and approximation ratios. They
represent an interesting trade-off between optimality of social cost and stability of agent’s incentives, especially in light of
the fact that finding social optima and best response strategies in these games is NP-hard.
There are a number of interesting open problems that arise from our work. We have shown that certain classes
of primal–dual algorithms can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria. A similar result is known to hold for
cooperative games and mechanism design. However, in our non-cooperative model we need to find stable allocations
of payments to resources. Because of this allocation property, the application of approximation algorithms to compute
approximate Nash equilibria ismuchmore challenging. In particular, it would be interesting to see if primal–dual algorithms
for Steiner network problems can be applied to compute (α, β)-NE with small constant ratios in variants of connection
games.
In addition, there are other interesting stability and fairness concepts in our model. For instance, it is an interesting open
problem to characterize existence and cost of exact and approximate versions of coalitional stability concepts like strong
equilibria,which have been studied recently in single source connection games [22]. Finally, there aremany other interesting
minimization problems, for which the analysis of corresponding cost sharing games can provide interesting insights into
the stability of incentives.
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